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ALTERING THE TAX MIX IN ALBERTA
Kenneth McKenzie
SUMMARY
Stepping off the resource royalty roller-coaster and adopting a more equitable 
and efficient tax system has an important role to play in addressing Alberta’s 
fiscal problems and promoting prosperity. Such a system would have several 
components. One would be a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 12 to 
eight per cent, which the UCP government has already announced. Another 
would be to maintain the full provincial carbon tax imposed by the previous 
NDP government, but ensure that it is revenue neutral. The progressive rate 
structure in personal income tax should be also be maintained, with a tax cut for 
the middle class. Finally, a harmonized provincial sales tax should be adopted. 
Changes to current provincial fiscal policies are crucial; without them, Alberta 
could run a deficit of nearly $40 billion by 2040. No longer can the province rely 
on the boom part of its traditional boom-and-bust economy to bail it out of the 
bad times. With global policies focused on decarbonization and technological 
innovations around shale oil and gas and fracking, the growth in the demand 
for oil from traditional oilsands projects is expected to decline. Nor can Alberta 
continue to rely on the United States to buy its oil; the U.S. has gone from being 
Canada’s biggest customer to being its biggest rival in the industry.
In addition, Alberta will face different kinds of expenditures than it did in the 
past – health care, for example, will eat up a bigger chunk of the provincial 
budget in the coming years with the aging of the population. A return to the 
fiscal policies of the 1990s simply isn’t feasible. 
Corporate tax cuts are a logical place to start because these cuts will have a 
positive effect on both investment and on wage earners. When corporate taxes 
increase, investment declines and wages drop as the effects spread out into 
the larger economy. Research has shown that for every $1 increase in corporate 
1income tax revenue due to a rate increase, aggregate wages in Alberta decline by about 
95 cents. Therefore, cutting corporate income taxes would have a beneficial effect on 
wages and stimulate the economy.
Recent research suggests that in a choice between a flat-tax system, such as Alberta had 
under previous Progressive Conservative governments, and a system of progressive tax 
brackets, from the perspective of an equity-efficiency trade-off maintaining a progressive 
rate structure has some merit. 
The UCP recently eliminated part of the provincial carbon tax, maintaining the levy on 
high emitters. As a result the federal backstop will apply. It would be better to maintain 
the full Alberta carbon tax, keep the revenue in Alberta and use it to further lower personal 
and corporate income taxes.
A provincial sales tax should be anathema no longer. A harmonized provincial sales tax 
in Alberta would provide an efficient, stable and non-volatile revenue source. To mitigate 
the burden of a sales tax and prevent it from being a deterrent to economic stimulus, 
there could be a refundable tax credit for lower-income Albertans and a cut in personal 
income tax rates for the middle class. A provincial sales tax would enable the Alberta 
government to get off the royalty roller-coaster. The dizzying ride that roller-coaster 
provided, and its concomitant blithe fiscal philosophy of “don’t worry, be happy”, has to 
come to an end. Lower growth in the demand for fossil fuels is the 21st century reality 
and Alberta must adapt its fiscal structures accordingly.
2The purpose of this paper is to examine alternative ways of raising government revenue 
in Alberta. There are several ways to approach this question. One would be to adopt 
a revenue-neutral perspective, which would focus on the design and configuration of 
the tax system without a view to raising more revenue. Another would be to evaluate 
various options from the perspective of raising sufficient revenue to eliminate or reduce 
the deficit going forward, or more generally to close the fiscal gap, in order to put the 
government on a sustainable fiscal path. Neither of these approaches is followed here. 
While the first approach is in some ways more pure from a tax policy perspective, 
it is possible that at least a modest increase in revenues will be required to put the 
government on a sustainable fiscal path. Moreover, there are several moving parts to 
the revenue system, and it is very difficult in this context to accurately take account of 
the various interactions. In terms of the second approach, it is not clear precisely how 
much higher revenues should be relied upon versus lower spending to restore fiscal 
sustainability. As Trevor Tombe (2018) puts it in a recent analysis of the sustainability 
of Alberta’s fiscal policy, “the province has neither a revenue problem nor a spending 
problem; it has a budget problem.” This problem can be addressed from the revenue 
side, the expenditure side or a combination of both. I don’t take a strong position on this.
Rather, I examine some of the key sources of government revenue and evaluate various 
policy options that would alter the tax mix without imposing a hard constraint of revenue 
neutrality or the need to generate a given amount of revenue to close the fiscal gap. 
In some cases, I argue for tax reductions and in others for tax increases. The focus is 
on first principles, drawing on what economic research on tax policy has to say about 
implementing an efficient and equitable tax system within an Alberta context. Of 
course, as will be discussed, this inevitably involves trade-offs and, also inevitably, some 
disagreement on the nature of those trade-offs. The net impact on total revenue from the 
type of changes I discuss in what follows may be positive or negative, but the magnitude 
of the revenue gains can be scaled up or down by adjusting rates appropriately; the first 
principles laid out here provide guidance on how best to go about that. 
Based on my analysis, and as a preview of my conclusions, I argue the following:
1. Cut the corporate income tax rate as planned.
2. Keep the full provincial carbon tax.
3. Maintain the progressive rate structure in the personal income tax (no flat tax), but 
consider a middle class personal income tax cut.
4. Impose a harmonized provincial sales tax.
While it is not the focus of the paper, I also argue for reintroducing systematic 
contributions of resource revenue to a stabilization fund, and eventually, the Heritage 
Savings Trust Fund.
3THE BIG PICTURE: WHERE HAVE WE BEEN, WHERE ARE WE 
NOW AND WHERE ARE WE GOING?
WHERE HAVE WE BEEN?
In the early 2000s, the province was regularly in a surplus position and boasted of 
having the lowest taxes in the country on several fronts (and all without a sales tax!). This 
changed in 2015 in conjunction with, of course, a significant slump in oil prices. The spring 
budget of that year, tabled by the sitting Progressive Conservative government, projected 
a significant deficit. Running on that budget, the PCs were defeated by the NDP in the 
subsequent election. In its inaugural first quarter fiscal update, the new NDP government 
projected even more sizable deficits going forward. The rest, as they say, is history.
Figure 1 provides a big-picture perspective of Alberta’s own revenue sources (not 
including federal transfers) over the last four decades. The big three own-revenue 
sources – personal income tax (PIT), corporate income tax (CIT) and resource revenues – 
along with an aggregate of the rest of own-source revenues are plotted relative to GDP. 
It is evident that aggregate own-source revenue relative to GDP has actually fallen rather 
significantly over the almost 40-year period, peaking at about 18 per cent in the mid-
1980s and falling to about 10 per cent in 2017/18. This is largely because of the reduction 
in other and resource revenue relative to the size of the economy; PIT and CIT revenues 
relative to GDP have been relatively stable.
FIGURE 1  OWN-SOURCE REVENUE AS A SHARE OF GDP: ALBERTA,  
1981/82-2017/78
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Source: Author calculations based on Kneebone and Wilkins (2016).
To be clear, these are own-source revenues and do not include federal transfers, which 
have also grown over this period, nor deficit financing. So this is not to say that the 
size of government in Alberta (as would be measured, for example, by government 
spending relative to GDP) has declined over this period. Rather, non-transfer, non-
deficit financing has.
4In particular, over the recent three-year period from 2015-2018, resource revenue relative 
to GDP ranged from 0.8 per cent in 2015/16 to 1.5 per cent in 2017/18. Compare this to 
the average over the pre-2015 period, which was almost 4.5 per cent. However, it is also 
evident from the figure that resource revenue is very volatile. As a share of GDP, it has 
ranged from a low of 0.8 per cent in 2015/16, to seven per cent in 2000/01, to as high 
as 8.7 per cent in 1981/82. If resource revenues were currently at their historical average 
relative to the size of the economy, own-source revenue would be 13 per cent of GDP; if 
resource revenues were at their peak relative to the size of the economy, as in the early 
’80s and ’00s, total own-source revenue relative to GDP would be in the order of 17 or 18 
per cent.
The implications of the volatility of resource revenue for Alberta’s public finances can be 
examined in various ways. One approach is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots resource 
revenue as a share of total own-source revenue (left axis) and the provincial budget 
deficit relative to GDP (right axis). The wide variation in the share of provincial own-
source revenue accounted for by resource revenues is evident: ranging from almost 50 
per cent in the early ’80s, falling to 15 per cent over the ’90s, rising again to between 30 
and 45 per cent in the ’00s, and falling again to between nine and a little under 15 per 
cent over the last three years.
FIGURE 2 RESOURCE REVENUE/GDP AND DEFICIT/GDP: ALBERTA 1981/82-2017/18
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Source: Author calculations based on Kneebone and Wilkins (2016).
Also evident from Figure 2 is the inverse relationship between the share of resource 
revenue and the provincial deficit. When resource revenue as a share of total own-source 
revenue is high, the province tends to run surpluses; when the share is low, it tends to run 
deficits (the raw correlation coefficient is just under -0.60).
Of course, this is not at all surprising – “it’s not rocket surgery”, as former treasurer and 
Finance minister Jim Dinning was fond of saying – and is indeed sensible as the deficit 
5can act as an absorber for economic shocks, muting the need to drastically adjust 
revenues and expenditures over business cycles. Running deficits in bad times is fine so 
long as we run surpluses (or at least lower deficits) in good times.1 
However, as first documented by Kneebone and McKenzie (1999a), the province has 
displayed a marked tendency to treat positive and negative fiscal shocks arising from 
volatile energy prices asymmetrically, following what they call the “don’t worry, be 
happy” approach to fiscal policy: negative shocks are treated as temporary (so don’t 
worry, be happy), while positive shocks are treated as permanent (be even happier). 
More recent evidence backs this up. Ferede (2018) estimates impulse response functions 
for key fiscal variables in Alberta in response to positive and negative shocks to resource 
revenues. He finds a similar asymmetric pattern in response to positive and negative 
shocks. More specifically, he estimates that a $1 increase in real per capita resource 
revenue is associated with a 56-cent increase in real per capita program spending one 
year later (which is statistically different from zero). By contrast, he estimates that a $1 
decrease in resource revenue is associated with only a 1.3-cent decrease in program 
spending one year later (which is actually statistically indistinguishable from zero).
This asymmetry means that expenditures tend to notch up over time in response to 
cycles of positive and negative shocks to resource revenue. This eventually leads to 
the emergence of structural deficits, a fiscal gap and unsustainable fiscal policy, not 
to mention catchy bumper sticker slogans: “Please God, give us another oil boom; we 
promise not to piss it away this time.” 
As a result, the tendency in Alberta has been to punctuate the “don’t worry, be happy” 
approach with periodic fiscal retrenchments when a fiscal crisis is perceived. An obvious 
example is the “Klein Revolution” in the mid-1990s. As documented by Bruce, Kneebone 
and McKenzie (1997), in response to a string of deficits arising largely from low oil prices 
and years of “don’t worry, be happy” budgeting, the Klein government cut real per capita 
expenditures by more than 20 per cent. In just two years, a $3.4-billion deficit became 
an almost $1-billion surplus (helped, of course, by an increase in oil prices!). Perhaps 
arguably, we have reached a similar perceived crisis state today.
It bears pointing out that the introduction of capital and stabilization funds in 2002 and 
2003 respectively provided a temporary departure from the “don’t worry, be happy” 
pattern, and provided a cushion during the 2009-10 recession. However, true to form, the 
government continued to deplete those funds despite the return of a boom – reversion 
back to the “don’t worry, be happy” approach (MacMillan 2019, sec. 7).
Thus we see that a key aspect, and vulnerability, of Alberta’s government finances lies 
in the important role played by resource revenues. On the one hand, resource revenues 
have allowed the province to keep other taxes lower and/or expenditures higher than 
other provinces without high debt levels. On the other hand, it subjects aggregate 
1 
Deficits can be run indefinitely on a sustainable basis, without increasing the debt/GDP ratio, if the growth 
rate in the economy exceeds the rate of interest on government debt. In this regard, as shown in Kneebone 
and McKenzie (1999b), the more volatile the growth rate, the higher the sustainable tax rate required to 
maintain a given debt/GDP ratio.
6revenues to significant fluctuations with implications for long-run fiscal sustainability. I 
will return to the role of resource revenues in Alberta later in the paper.
WHERE ARE WE NOW?
Figures 3 and 4 provide a more detailed breakdown of current Alberta government 
revenues. The data are based on the forecast for 2018/19 as reported in the third quarter 
Fiscal Update and Economic Statement. Figure 3 presents dollar figures (millions), and 
Figure 4 as a percentage of total revenue (including federal transfers). 
FIGURE 3 ALBERTA GOVERNMENT REVENUE ($MILLIONS), 2018/19
Source: Government of Alberta, Third Quarter Fiscal Update
7FIGURE 4  ALBERTA GOVERNMENT REVENUE (PER CENT OF TOTAL REVENUE), 
2018/19
Source: Government of Alberta, Third Quarter Fiscal Update
Of the $49.7 billion in total revenue forecast for 2018/19, $41.3 billion (83 per cent) is 
own-source revenue, the remainder coming from federal transfers, primarily the Canada 
Health Transfer and the Canada Social Transfer ($4.4 billion and $1.6 billion respectively, 
not reported in the figures).
We see that the personal income tax (PIT) is the single biggest source of revenue at $12.1 
billion, accounting for 24 per cent of total revenue (and almost 30 per cent of own source 
revenue). This is followed by resource revenue at $5.5 billion (11 per cent), the corporate 
income tax at $4.1 billion (eight per cent), and education property taxes at $2.4 billion 
(five per cent). The fuel tax and the carbon levy collectively are projected to generate 
$2.7 billion (six per cent).
8The third quarter statement forecast a deficit for 2018/19 of $6.9 billion.
Of course, with the election of the new United Conservative Party government, things are 
likely to change.
WHERE ARE WE GOING? THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT
But none of this is new. Surely, we can weather the storm, much as we have in the past 
(“Please God ...”)? Perhaps. However, there are compelling reasons to expect that this 
time is different.
Tombe (2018) undertakes the very dicey and heroic task of examining Alberta’s long-
term fiscal prospects. If there are no fundamental changes in government fiscal policies, 
he projects a deficit of almost $40 billion by 2040, the equivalent of more than $14 billion 
today. He calculates that, coupled with capital investments that also add to debt, this 
could raise the ratio of net debt to GDP to almost 50 per cent by 2040 – higher than at 
any point in Alberta’s history (and higher than for any province today). 
Juxtaposed on all of this are three important underlying forces which are not cyclical 
in nature. The first is an emerging secular trend to lower growth in oil demand due to 
decarbonization. Most high-income countries are embarking on a low-carbon energy 
transition to increased reliance on low carbon and renewable energy. To some extent, 
this will be offset by higher growth in fossil fuel demand from lower-income countries, 
but overall the trend seems to be toward lower growth. There is, of course, considerable 
uncertainty regarding the pace of this transition. Predictions of peak demand should be 
taken with the same grain of salt as past predictions of peak supply. And indeed, the 
peak is more likely to resemble a plateau, perhaps emerging slowly over 20 years or 
more, followed by a long tail. While the rate of growth is anticipated to decline, oil isn’t 
going away any time soon. In its World Energy Outlook, for example, the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) (2018) base scenario forecast of world oil demand for 2040 is 
about 105 million barrels a day, slightly higher than the current demand of just under 100 
million. However, it emphasizes that an acceleration of government policies worldwide 
toward decarbonization and the acceleration of technological innovations could lead to 
lower demand.
The second force is also technological: the emergence of shale oil and gas and new 
drilling technologies (fracking) in the U.S. Shale oil is a short-cycle resource that can be 
brought on line relatively quickly in response to oil price increases. This is in contrast 
to oilsands projects, which tend to be long-cycle with substantial upfront capital costs 
and longer payback periods. Oil production from the southern U.S. Permian basin has 
doubled in the last three years and is projected to surpass Canadian production in the 
next five years (and with considerably easier and cheaper access to refineries and export 
hubs on the Gulf coast). Once our biggest customer for oil, the U.S. has become our 
biggest competitor. The emergence of relatively inexpensive short-cycle oil in the U.S. 
has changed the game, and can be expected to put a (perhaps soft) cap on oil prices as 
supply can be ramped up relatively quickly in response to price increases.
No less important is the shale gas boom in the U.S. Hausman and Kellogg (2015) estimate 
that natural gas prices in the U.S. were 47 per cent lower compared to what the price 
9would have been prior to the fracking revolution in 2013. This has obvious implications for 
Alberta’s natural gas sector, which relies largely on exports to the U.S. 
Of course, it is a mug’s game to predict energy demand and prices, especially 20 or 30 
years into the future, and that is emphatically not my intent. It is entirely possible that the 
underlying energy market dynamics discussed above are either over- or understated; or 
even that we experience another oil price supercycle where oil demand and supply fall 
out of sync (in which case “please God ...). Rather, my point is that energy markets are 
changing in a fundamental and non-cyclical manner, albeit with considerable uncertainty 
regarding the nature and pace of change.
The third general force is demographic. The population is aging, with significant 
implications for health-care costs. Over the last 20 years, the share of Alberta’s 
population 65+ has increased from 9.8 per cent to 12.7 per cent, and the share is 
projected to increase significantly going forward. Tombe (2018) conservatively forecasts 
that this trend, coupled with technological changes in health care and other factors, will 
increase health-care spending as a percentage of provincial GDP from 6.2 per cent today 
to 7.7 per cent in the long run. 
And so Alberta must adapt. On the fiscal front, this means putting in place a revenue 
and expenditure framework appropriate for a future that is very unlikely to look like the 
past. This fiscal framework must be less vulnerable to the inevitable fluctuations and 
uncertainties along the way. It must dampen the traditional “don’t worry, be happy” 
approach to fiscal policy, which has tended to culminate in periodic fiscal crises and 
retrenchments and it must get the province off of the royalty roller-coaster. 
The focus here is on the revenue side of the equation. In broad strokes, I argue that this 
will require less reliance on resource revenues and corporate income taxes and more 
reliance on other revenue sources. And yes, this means both a sales tax and a carbon 
tax, and maintaining some degree of progressivity in the rate structure of the personal 
income tax.
SOME IMPORTANT CONCEPTS: THE TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT
In order to engage in a discussion of alternative revenue sources for the government 
of Alberta, it is first necessary to establish the criteria that will be used to compare and 
evaluate one source of tax revenue to another – in other words, we need to define the 
terms of engagement for the discussion.
The evaluative criteria employed follow the traditional welfare economics approach, which 
involves assessing the efficiency and equity implications of various taxes. Efficiency is a 
term widely used by economists, and widely misunderstood by everyone else. Economists 
employ a very precise notion of efficiency from a tax policy perspective: it is the cost to 
the economy over and above the amount of revenue raised from a tax. This excess cost 
is referred to as the excess burden of the tax. Most taxes entail excess burdens, whereby 
the cost to the economy exceeds the amount of tax revenue raised. Moreover, and 
importantly, these excess burdens differ from one source of tax revenue to another.
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Why is this the case? Taxes change prices (and costs) in the economy. In response to 
these price changes, people alter their behaviour – buying and selling fewer goods, 
working fewer hours, undertaking less capital investment, hiring fewer workers, etc. To 
the extent that people respond to a tax by altering their behaviour, this results in forgone 
transactions – transactions that otherwise would have occurred in the absence of a tax 
no longer take place in the presence of the tax. There is a loss to the economy from 
these forgone transactions; that loss is the forgone gains from trade which would have 
otherwise occurred in the absence of a tax.
Consider a simple example. Say you engage in a mutually beneficial transaction for 
landscaping services. Both you and the landscaping company must be better off engaging 
in this transaction, or else you wouldn’t engage in it – you both experience gains from 
trade. Now say the government imposes a tax on landscaping services, to be paid by the 
landscaping company. Say that because of the tax the company increases the price of the 
service. And, as a result, you decide not to engage the landscaping company because it is 
no longer beneficial for you to undertake the transaction – there is a behavioural change 
in response to the tax. But because you decide not to proceed, the government collects 
no tax from this transaction – tax revenue from the forgone transaction is zero. But both 
you and the landscaping company are clearly worse off – you both received gains from 
trade from engaging in the transaction without the tax which you now no longer enjoy. 
The loss to the economy (the lost gains from trade) exceeds the tax revenue raised (in this 
case zero); this loss is the excess burden of the tax.
 Of course, this is an extreme and overly simplified case, whereby the tax results in the 
complete elimination of the gains from trade from this transaction. More generally, we 
might see a reduction in the gains from trade, not the complete elimination (i.e., you 
decide to get just one tree planted instead of two), and the government raises some 
revenue from the tax rather than no revenue. Thus, we might expect a new tax (or an 
increase in an existing tax) to cause the tax base to shrink due to behavioural responses, 
not disappear altogether. However, the essence of the argument remains the same: taxes 
impose costs on the economy, measured by the excess burden, which exceed the tax 
revenue raised.
The fact that when a government increases (decreases) a tax, the activity being taxed 
(and the size of the tax base) tends to shrink (grow) as people respond to the tax 
change also has important implications for the revenue effects of a tax change. We can 
distinguish between two types of effects of a tax change on government revenues: the 
mechanical effect and the behavioural effect. The mechanical effect of a tax change 
on revenues is a relatively straightforward accounting exercise, which assumes no 
behavioural response on the part of those being taxed. This is often the effect highlighted 
in government fiscal documents which cost tax cuts or increases. The behavioural effect 
of a tax change on revenues takes explicit account of the impact on the underlying tax 
base, accounting for the resulting shrinkage (or growth in the case of a tax cut). The total 
impact on government revenues of a change in a tax rate is the sum of the mechanical 
and behavioural effects. A key metric in this regard is the elasticity (or sensitivity) of the 
underlying tax base with respect to changes in the tax rate. The elasticity of the tax base 
measures the percentage change in the size of the tax base in response to a one-per-
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cent change in the tax rate. Thus, if the tax rate increases by one per cent (i.e., from 10 
per cent to 10.1 per cent), and the tax base shrinks by 0.7 per cent due to the behavioural 
effects, the elasticity is 0.7. If the tax base is very elastic (responsive) to tax changes, 
the behavioural effect is large; if it is inelastic (unresponsive), it is small. The elasticity of 
the underlying tax base with respect to the tax rate thus bears directly upon the excess 
burden discussed above and on the change in revenue associated with a tax change.
All of this comes together in the concept of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF), 
which is a metric widely used by economists to measure the efficiency costs of raising 
more revenue by increasing an existing tax rate. The MCF is the total cost of raising one 
more dollar in tax revenue by increasing a tax by a small amount. It is equal to the $1 
in additional tax revenue raised plus the increase in the excess burden associated with 
the tax due to the behavioural responses discussed above. For example, say an existing 
tax is levied at the rate of 10 per cent. The government decides to increase the tax rate 
by 10 per cent, to 11 per cent. The mechanical effect of this tax increase, if there was no 
behavioural effect, would be to increase revenue from the tax by 10 per cent. However, 
if because of behavioural responses the size of the tax base shrinks by two per cent, tax 
revenue would increase by just eight per cent. The MCF in this case is (approximately) 
$1.25 (10/8).2 This means that the cost to the economy of generating one more dollar in 
tax revenue by increasing the tax rate is $1.25, which consists of the $1 in incremental tax 
revenue raised plus 25 cents in incremental excess burden.
This is important in what follows because different taxes give rise to different behavioural 
effects and therefore to different excess burdens and MCFs. A tax which entails a large 
behavioural response and therefore has a high MCF is less efficient, and more costly 
to the economy, than a tax which involves a low behavioural response and MCF. A tax 
that has a low MCF, and therefore impinges less on economic activity, is said to be 
more efficient than a tax which has a high MCF. All else equal, a tax system that is more 
efficient is preferred to a tax system which is less efficient.
But of course, all else is not equal, and efficiency is not the only relevant criterion for 
evaluating alternative sources of tax revenue. The government, and the society that it 
represents, is also concerned about the equity, or the distributional, implications of the 
tax system. While economists are relatively adept at assessing the excess burden of a tax 
(more or less objectively), comparing the equity implications of one tax versus another 
is more subjective, and involves a stronger value judgment. This is emphatically not to 
say that it is any less important. Indeed, most public discussion of taxes focuses largely 
on equity. Moreover, in some cases, tax systems that are very efficient (have a low MCF) 
result in a distribution of the burden of taxes which may be considered inequitable. 
Thus, tax policy decisions inevitably involve an equity-efficiency trade-off. An evaluation 
of this trade-off is the very essence of policy-making, and it is therefore important to 
understand both the efficiency and equity implications of any change to the tax system.
In this regard, it is important to be precise about who bears the economic burden of a 
tax. This involves a study of tax incidence. The economic incidence of a tax may differ 
2 
The calculation is approximate because a one-percentage-point change will obviously raise more than $1 in 
revenue.
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from the statutory (legal) incidence. That is, the party that is legally required to pay a tax 
may be very different from the parties that are economically burdened by a tax. This is 
the case because, as discussed above, taxes change prices in the economy, and therefore 
affect behaviour. In terms of the landscaping example, while the tax is legally paid by 
the owner of the landscaping company, the burden of the tax may not fall entirely on 
the owner. We saw that you (the demander of landscaping services) bear some of the 
burden of the tax by virtue of the forgone gains from trade due to the higher price. It 
could also be that the remaining burden of the tax actually doesn’t fall on the owner 
of the landscaping company at all, but rather on employees who may be laid off, work 
fewer hours or suffer a reduction in wages. Thus, the economic incidence of a tax – who 
bears the ultimate burden of the tax – can differ significantly from the legal liability. The 
economic incidence of a tax bears directly on the distributional implications of a tax, and 
therefore on the issue of equity.
With the terms of engagement in hand, we are ready to address the question of 
alternative revenue sources for Alberta.
CORPORATE INCOME TAX: THE COSTLIEST TAX OF ALL! 
Figure 5 shows the general provincial CIT rates in Alberta, B.C., Saskatchewan, Ontario 
and Quebec from 1990 to 2018. A few things are noteworthy. First, with the exception 
of Quebec, provincial CIT rates were generally quite high throughout the 1990s; the 
provincial CIT rate in 2000 in Alberta was 15.5 per cent. In 2001, CIT rates began to fall 
quite dramatically, led by Alberta. By 2006, the general CIT rate in Alberta was 10 per 
cent, the lowest in the country (essentially tied with Quebec); it was matched later by B.C. 
in 2011. In 2015, Alberta increased the CIT rate to 12 per cent, identical to Saskatchewan 
and B.C., and just slightly higher than Quebec (11.6 per cent) and Ontario (11.5 per cent). 
FIGURE 5  SELECTED PROVINCIAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATES, 1990-2019
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Notably, referring back to Figure 1, the substantial Alberta CIT tax cuts starting in 2001 
had little discernible impact on provincial CIT revenue relative to the size of the economy. 
From 1990 to 2000, the CIT rate averaged just under 15.5 per cent and CIT revenues as a 
percentage of GDP averaged 1.23 per cent; from 2001 to 2018, the CIT rate averaged 11.1 
per cent and the CIT to GDP ratio averaged 1.38 per cent.
As discussed above, a key metric in assessing both the efficiency implications and the 
revenue effects of a change in a tax rate is the size of the behavioural effect, as measured 
by the elasticity of the tax base. Table 1 presents some recent estimates of the long-run 
semi-elasticity of the three most important tax bases for Canadian provinces, (corporate 
income tax (CIT), personal income tax (PIT) and provincial sales tax (PST)) for Alberta 
from Dahlby and Ferede in their 2016 paper entitled “The Costliest Tax of All: Raising 
Revenue Through Corporate Tax Hikes Can be Counter-Productive for Provinces”.3 
The semi-elasticity is related to the elasticity and measures the percentage decline 
in the tax base associated with a one-percentage-point increase in the tax rate. They 
estimate a semi-elasticity of -13.10 for the CIT base in Alberta, which means that a one-
percentage-point increase in the provincial CIT rate (e.g., from 12 per cent to 13 per cent), 
is associated with a 13.10-per-cent reduction in the CIT base.
TABLE 1  LONG-RUN TAX BASE SEMI-ELASTICITY ESTIMATES AND MARGINAL 
COST OF PUBLIC FUNDS (MCF), ALBERTA
CIT Base PIT Base Sales Tax Base
CIT Rate PIT Rate CIT Rate PIT Rate N/A
Semi-elasticity -13.10 -0.28* 3.19 -2.89 N/A
MCF 2.91 1.41 1.00
Source: Dahlby and Ferede (2016).
* Not statistically different from zero.
It is important to emphasize two points in this regard. The first is that these are long-
run estimates. We would not expect to see changes in the tax base of this magnitude 
immediately, but over several years. In the short run, mechanical changes in tax revenues 
will dominate; behavioural effects will manifest over time. For example, in previous 
research, Dahlby and Ferede (2012) estimate a short-run semi-elasticity for the corporate 
tax across all provinces of -3.67, which is significantly lower. Second, it is also important 
to emphasize that these are point estimates from just one study. While there is virtual 
unanimity among economists regarding the existence and sign of these behavioural 
effects, in general there is some uncertainty, and indeed by my reading of the research 
no clear consensus regarding their magnitude. Unfortunately, there is no other work that 
focuses specifically on Canadian provinces in this regard.
Why does the CIT base shrink in response to an increase in the corporate tax rate? 
There are two general reasons for this. One is that investment declines. This is because 
an increase in the CIT rate increases the before-tax hurdle rate of return required by 
3 
As discussed below, in the case of the PIT they consider an increase in the tax rate on the top income bracket.
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the owners of firms. As a result, and over time, firms will invest less in response to an 
increase in the tax rate, which will lower the CIT base. This is a real effect, which has 
been documented quite extensively in many studies. For example, in a review of the 
academic research in this area, Hassett and Hubbard (2002) conclude that the consensus 
estimate of the impact of a one-per-cent increase in the after-tax hurdle rate of return 
is a reduction in the capital stock of between 0.5 and 1.0 per cent. A Canadian study by 
Parsons (2008) puts it at 0.7 per cent. Another more recent, but preliminary, Canadian 
study by Wen and Yilmaz (2019), which focuses on investment in machinery and 
equipment only, provides an estimate of between 1.1 to 1.3 per cent. So the real effects of 
the CIT in terms of decreased investment exist, and are not insignificant.
In this regard, consider the impact of the reduction in the provincial CIT rate from 12 
percent to 8 percent, as announced by the new UCP government. The rate will go from 
12 percent to 11 percent on July 1 2019, dropping another point each year until it hits 8 
percent in 2022. Table 1 shows calculations of the aggregate marginal effective tax rate 
(METR) on capital in Alberta and other provinces for various scenarios.4 The METR 
measures the extent to which the corporate tax system distorts the hurdle rate of return 
on capital investment. The hurdle rate of return is the minimum rate of return required 
by the firm in order to undertake an investment. The METR measures the share of the 
before-tax hurdle rate of return required to pay the associated taxes. For example, if the 
after-tax hurdle rate of return required by the firm is 10 percent, and the before-tax rate 
of return required to generate that 10 percent after-tax rate of return is 12 percent, then 
the METR is 16.67 percent.5
TABLE 1  AGGREGATE MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES (METR) IN  
CANADIAN PROVINCES
2018 Pre-Fiscal Update 2019 Post-Fiscal Update Alberta Tax Cut Fully Implemented
Newfoundland 12.8 7.4 7.4
PEI 15.4 10.3 10.3
Nova Scotia 17.8 12.7 12.7
New Brunswick 14.8 9.8 9.8
Quebec 14.3 10.6 10.6
Ontario 18.3 13.9 13.9
Manitoba 27.0 23.7 23.7
Saskatchewan 23.9 20.5 20.5
Alberta 18.5 14.5 11.9
British Columbia 27.6 24.3 24.3
Canada Average 19.2 15.3 14.9
Source: Calculations provided by Phil Bazel, School of Public Policy.
4 
The METR calculations were kindly provided by Phil Bazel of the School of Public Policy.
5 
Calculated as (12-10)/12=16.67 percent.
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As seen in the first column of the table, prior to the introduction of accelerated 
depreciation by the federal government in the 2018 fall economic update,6 at 18.5 
percent the METR in Alberta was lower than the Canadian average of 19.2 percent, 
about on par with Ontario, significantly lower than B.C., Saskatchewan and Manitoba, 
but higher than Quebec and the Atlantic provinces.7 Column 2 shows METRs after the 
implementation of accelerated tax depreciation by the federal government announced 
in the 2018 fall economic update in response to the 2018 U.S. tax reform. The update 
implemented accelerated tax depreciation for most capital assets, including immediate 
full expensing for manufacturing and processing assets along with clean energy 
and storage assets. Accelerated depreciation is slated to end on December 31 2023. 
Accelerated tax depreciation lowers the aggregate METR in Canada to 15.3 percent, 
and in Alberta to 14.5 percent. Notable in this regard is the fact that all of the provinces, 
including Alberta, adopted the federal accelerated depreciation deductions for provincial 
CIT purposes.8 The final column in Table 1 shows the METRs assuming no changes in the 
CIT at the federal level or in the other provinces, after the four percentage point CIT rate 
cut is fully implemented in Alberta by 2022. The rate cut lowers the METR in Alberta from 
14.5 percent currently to 11.9 percent, one of the lowest in the country. Relative to the 
pre-economic update METR in the fall of 2018, by 2022 the METR on capital investment 
in Alberta will have declined significantly, by 6.6 percentage points (from 18.5 percent 
to 11.9 percent). Using an elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the hurdle rate 
of return of 0.7, as discussed above, relative to the post-economic update, the Alberta 
provincial rate cut would be expected to increase the size of the capital stock in Alberta 
in the long run by about 3 percent.
The other reason that the CIT base shrinks in response to an increase in the corporate tax 
rate is income shifting. This is a tax planning effect which can take place along several 
dimensions. For example, through various (legal) tax planning techniques, companies 
can shift income between jurisdictions in response to differences in tax rates in order 
to lower their overall tax bill. Canadian firms can shift income either internationally or 
interprovincially. Studies of international income shifting suggest that tax differentials 
between jurisdictions can result in quite a bit of income shifting. A recent study by Dowd 
et al. (2017) of tax planning by U.S. multinational enterprises (MNEs) is of particular 
relevance to Canada. They estimate a semi-elasticity for high-tax (non-tax haven) 
affiliates of -0.7 (that is, a one-percentage-point increase in the tax differential causes 
affiliate income to decline by 0.7 per cent). 
Interprovincial income shifting is also thought to be important. For example, Mintz and 
Smart (2004) analyze data from administrative tax records to compare the behaviour of 
Canadian corporate subsidiaries that may engage in income shifting across provinces, 
6 
See McKenzie and Smart (2019) for a discussion within the context of the U.S. tax reform.
7 
The high METRs in B.C., Saskatchewan and Manitoba partly reflects the fact that the provincial sales tax 
in these provinces is not harmonized with the federal GST and therefore falls to some extent on business 
investment. The low METRs in the Atlantic provinces is due in large part to the federal Atlantic Investment Tax 
Credit, a 10 percent tax credit provided to investments in farming, forestry, fishing and manufacturing and 
processing in the Atlantic provinces and the Gaspe Peninsula region of Quebec.
8 
This is discussed in more detail below.
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due to having multi-province enterprises, to comparable single-province firms that 
cannot. They conclude that interprovincial income shifting has pronounced effects on 
provincial tax bases. According to their preferred estimate, the elasticity of taxable 
income with respect to tax rates for income-shifting Canadian firms is 4.9, compared  
with 2.3 for other comparable firms.
Yet another tax planning effect relates to the type of income earned. For example, 
corporate income can be turned into capital gains taxed at the personal level through 
various tax planning strategies. This means that an increase in the tax on one tax base 
may cause that base to shrink, but another tax base may increase as income is converted 
into a now (relatively) lower-taxed type of income. This is reflected in Table 2, where we 
see that the cross semi-elasticity of the PIT base with respect to the CIT rate is 3.19. This 
means that a one-percentage-point increase in the CIT rate is associated with a 3.19-per-
cent increase in the PIT base.
And so, changes in the CIT rate have both real and income-shifting effects which 
can affect the size of the tax base. All of this has important implications for both the 
efficiency and revenue effects of a change in the provincial CIT rate.
Table 2 also presents Dahlby’s and Ferede’s corresponding estimates of the long-run 
MCF for the three taxes in Alberta based on their semi-elasticity estimates. Their estimate 
of the MCF for the CIT in Alberta is $2.91. Thus, raising one more dollar in revenue by 
increasing the CIT rate incrementally imposes an additional cost on the economy (an 
increase in the excess burden) of $1.91. This is substantially higher than for other revenue 
sources like the PIT and PST, where their estimate of the MCF is substantially lower 
($1.41 and $1 respectively).9 While Dahlby’s and Ferede’s MCF estimates are at the upper 
end of the spectrum, this ranking is consistent with other studies.10 From an efficiency 
perspective, there is broad agreement that the CIT is indeed the costliest tax of all. 
But efficiency isn’t the only thing that matters. We should also be concerned about the 
distribution of the burden of the corporate tax across different groups of individuals. In 
this regard, the popular perception of the incidence of the corporate income tax is that 
since the legal liability for paying it lies with corporations, the burden of the CIT must fall 
largely on the owners of corporations (shareholders) through lower profits. In this case, 
as shareholders tend to be higher income, from a distributional perspective the CIT may 
be considered by some to be more attractive in terms of the equity-efficiency trade-off 
than other sources of revenue.
As discussed above, this can be misleading – the economic incidence of a tax can be 
very different from the legal incidence. While the economic incidence of the CIT is a 
matter of some controversy, there is considerable evidence that some, and perhaps 
9 
The MCF for a PST in Alberta is $1 because we currently have no PST. This is discussed in more detail below.
10 
For example, a general equilibrium model implemented by the Department of Finance (Baylor and 
Beauséjour 2004) calculates the MCF for the federal CIT in Canada at about 1.40. Note, however, that this is 
a simulation exercise, based on assumptions regarding underlying elasticities. Moreover, the study is for the 
federal CIT; we would expect the MCF to be higher at the provincial level because capital mobility is higher. 
Also, the study explicitly does not account for income shifting, which is thought to be an important source of 
inefficiency.
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most, of the economic burden of a CIT levied at the provincial level falls on employees, 
through lower wages, rather than on owners. One way that this can occur is through 
lower real investment, as discussed above. If firms lower investment in response 
to an increase in the CIT rate, this lowers the capital/labour ratio, which lowers the 
productivity of workers, which leads to lower wages. This is thought to be particularly 
important in small open economies like Canada, and even more so for provinces within a 
small open economy, like Alberta.
A nascent, but growing, empirical literature supports this view. While there remains 
some disagreement on the magnitude of the effects, it is now generally accepted that 
at least some of the burden of the CIT falls on labour through lower wages. Indeed, in 
the past in its allocation of the burden of various taxes, the Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO) in the U.S. typically assumed that the entire burden of the federal CIT was borne 
by those who received income from capital investments (i.e., owners). However, since 
2012, the CBO has assumed that wage earners bear 25 per cent of the U.S. CIT. And this 
may well be on the low side. In an assessment of computable general equilibrium models 
in a U.S. context, Gravelle (2013) puts the share closer to 40 per cent. Moreover, and 
very importantly for our discussion, this share is likely to be even higher for small open 
economies like Canada, and even more for smaller open economies like Alberta. In a 
recent paper commenting on the U.S. corporate tax cuts, respected U.S. economist Alan 
Auerbach (2018, 100) argues that “a large recent literature on corporate tax incidence 
looks within countries, considering differences across industries and across states or 
regions ... the findings are typically that a large share of the corporate tax falls on labor 
– quite plausible for changes adopted in a small part of a country in which there is 
considerable capital mobility.”
A recent Canadian study in this vein by McKenzie and Ferede (2017) backs this up. They 
estimate that a one-per-cent increase in the CIT rate by a Canadian province is associated 
in the long run with a reduction in the capital/labour ratio of about 0.23 per cent. In 
turn, a one-per-cent reduction in the capital/labour ratio is associated with a reduction 
in real hourly wages of about 0.46 per cent. Together, these suggest that a one-per-cent 
increase in the CIT rate is associated with about a 0.10-per-cent decrease in the real wage 
rate in the long run. This is consistent with much of the research in this area. Because this 
reduction in the real wage rate is spread over many workers, and the size of the aggregate 
wages dwarfs corporate income tax revenue, McKenzie and Ferede calculate that for 
every $1 increase in CIT revenue due to an increase in the CIT rate, aggregate wages in 
Alberta decline by about 95 cents. This suggests that much of the economic burden of the 
CIT levied by Canadian provinces actually falls on wage earners. This renders it perhaps 
less attractive from a distributional perspective than the popular perception.
It is important to emphasize again that the elasticities discussed here, which bear 
critically upon the size of the behavioural responses and therefore on both the efficiency 
and incidence of the corporate tax, are long-run estimates. Moreover, as indicated, there 
is some uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the effects. 
Based on their estimates, Dahlby and Ferede (2016) calculate that the Alberta CIT rate 
that would maximize government revenues is 15.2 per cent. Combined with the 15 per 
cent federal tax rate, this suggests a revenue-maximizing combined CIT rate of a little 
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over 30 per cent, which is in fact at the lower range of other estimates of the revenue-
maximizing rate based on international data. For example, Clausing (2007) estimates a 
revenue-maximizing tax rate for OECD countries of about 33 per cent. Brill and Hassett 
(2007) provide estimates that range from about 30 per cent to 37 per cent, again using 
OECD data. At 27 per cent, the current combined federal Alberta rate is thus less than 
what might be considered a reasonable lower bound estimate of the revenue-maximizing 
rate. This suggests that any CIT rate cut in Alberta would not be expected to be self-
financing in terms of generating more revenue due to behavioural responses than is lost 
due to the mechanical effect.
In this regard, consider again the reduction in the Alberta CIT rate from 12 per cent to 
eight per cent, a 33.33-per-cent reduction as announced by the new UCP government. 
To determine the impact of such a tax cut on government revenues in the long run, 
as discussed above, we must account for both mechanical and behavioural effects. 
Mechanically, accounting for no change in the tax base, a four-percentage-point CIT cut 
would lower CIT revenues by 33.33 per cent and total own-source revenue by about 3.3 
per cent, equivalent to about $1.36 billion in terms of the 2019 CIT revenue forecast. 
Note that the size of the mechanical reduction in tax revenues is quite precise, as it is 
not based on a statistical estimate of the sensitivity of the underlying tax base, but on 
the real thing. Relatedly, the mechanical revenue costs occur up front, in the immediate 
and short run. However, from the discussion above we know that there will be two types 
of behavioural effects that will manifest over time. The first will be an increase in the 
CIT base due to an increase in real investment and income shifting. The second will be 
a reduction in the PIT base. Using the long-run semi-elasticity estimates of Dahlby and 
Ferede (2016), the behavioural offset to the 3.3 per cent mechanical revenue loss in 
total own-source revenue is about 1.4 per cent, giving a net total reduction in total own-
source revenue after accounting for long-run behavioural effects of about 1.9 per cent, 
equivalent to about $770 million annually in terms of the 2019 CIT revenue forecast.11
Some caveats are in order. First, I emphasize again that these are long-run effects, and 
will take place over time. Second, the calculations depend critically on the semi-elasticity 
estimates. As indicated, Dahlby and Ferede (2016) is but one study; however, it is the only 
rigorous study at the provincial level in Canada. In this regard, there are several empirical 
issues associated with estimating the sensitivity of the corporate income tax base which 
suggest caution. Kawano and Slemrod (2015), for example, examine the research in this 
area and identify several empirical problems. One, for example, is failure to control for 
statutory changes in the CIT base over time, which may or may not accompany any rate 
changes. They argue that the failure to account for these changes biases estimates of the 
elasticity of the CIT base upwards.
While the revenue implications of a corporate tax cut are important, there is therefore 
some uncertainty about what they might be, given our state-of-the-art understanding of 
11 
The percentage change in own-source revenue is given by the following equation:  
∆R/R=sc(∆tc/tc)+scecc∆tc+spepc∆tc, where ∆R/R is the percentage change in own-source revenue, sc is the share 
of total own-source revenue accounted for by CIT, tc is the current CIT rate, ∆tc is the change in the CIT rate, 
ecc is the own semi-elasticity of the CIT base with respect to the CIT rate, epc is the cross semi-elasticity of the 
PIT base with respect to the CIT rate, and sp is share of total own-source revenue accounted for by PIT.
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the behavioural effects. However, and very importantly, the case for a corporate tax rate 
cut does not in my view hinge critically on this. Regardless of the revenue implications, 
there is little doubt that the provincial CIT is a costly source of revenue in terms of 
economic efficiency relative to other types of taxes. Moreover, given that much of the 
burden of the tax is thought to fall on wage earners, it is debatable as to whether this is 
offset by a more equitable distribution of the tax burden. And so, a compelling argument 
can be made for reducing the corporate tax rate and relying less on corporate income 
taxes as a revenue source.
I conclude with some comments on undertaking a more fundamental change in the 
way that we tax corporations in Alberta. Many economists have argued for a move 
towards a so-called rent-based approach to corporate taxation.12 The current structure 
of the corporate income tax in Canada results in the taxation of both the normal 
and above-normal returns to equity-financed investment.13 As discussed above, this 
distorts investment and lowers the capital stock in the economy. A rent-based tax 
would tax the above-normal return to capital only, and would therefore be significantly 
less distortionary. An example of a rent tax is a simple cash flow tax, though other 
approaches are possible (Boadway and Tremblay 2014, 2016). In previous work 
(McKenzie and Smart 2019a, 2019b), I have argued that such an approach should be 
seriously considered in Canada, particularly in response to the recent corporate tax 
reforms and significant tax cuts in the U.S. A key consideration in comparing a CIT rate 
cut to a more fundamental reform such as a cash flow tax is that with a CIT rate cut, most 
of the immediate mechanical benefit of the rate cut accrues to income generated by 
investments made in the past (so-called sunk capital). In this regard, a CIT rate cut is not 
well targeted and results in a windfall gain to sunk capital. A move to a rent tax would 
be better targeted, and less expensive in the short run, as it applies to new investments 
only.14 However, implementing a rent-based tax in a single province within the federation 
raises some challenges.
The adoption of a rent-based tax at the federal level would naturally facilitate a similar 
move by the provinces. Most of the other provinces do not administer their own 
corporate income tax, but rather rely on the administration of the Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA) under the Tax Collection Agreement. This requires the provinces to 
employ the federal tax base and other structural features of the federal corporate 
income tax. The two exceptions to this are Quebec and Alberta. Alberta administers 
its own corporate tax system under the provincial Tax and Revenue Administration 
(TRA). While in principle this suggests the possibility that Alberta could adopt its 
own tax base, including a rent-based tax, in practice departures from the structure 
of the federal tax have been very limited. According to Dolson (2016), the Alberta 
corporate income tax very closely mirrors the federal tax. Indeed, as discussed above, 
Alberta automatically adopted the accelerated depreciation introduced by the federal 
12 
See for example Boadway and Tremblay (2014, 2016).
13 
The “normal” rate of return is the minimum rate of return (sometimes called the hurdle rate of return) required 
by shareholders in the firm.
14 
There are transition issues concerning the treatment of sunk capital that would need to be addressed.
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government in the 2018 fall economic update.15 Moreover, as per Dolson (2016): “The TRA 
seldom audits or engages with most corporate taxpayers, owing to its reliance on the 
CRA to assure the correct computation of taxable income. Further, Alberta’s corporate 
income tax assessments and reassessments typically follow the federal assessments 
and reassessments.” A “go it alone” move to a rent tax in Alberta, in the absence of a 
similar move at the federal level, would also open up many tax planning margins across 
provinces and other complications within the federation. Thus, while in principle Alberta 
could adopt a completely different corporate base, such as a rent tax, in practice this 
seems unlikely from a practical perspective at this time.
PERSONAL INCOME TAX: BACK TO THE FLAT TAX?
I now turn to personal income taxes (PIT). Table 3 gives the marginal rate structure of 
the PIT for the federal government and Alberta. Table 4 provides some comparative 
information on the PIT system across provinces, focusing on the tax rates applied to 
the lowest and highest brackets. Alberta stands out relative to other provinces in three 
general ways. 
First, the basic personal amount is the amount of income that can be earned without 
paying taxes. Alberta stands out from the other provinces as having a very high basic 
personal amount, just under $20,000. The next highest province is Saskatchewan at 
about $16,000. The other provinces have basic personal amounts in the neighbourhood 
of the federal amount of about $12,000. Thus, Albertans are able to earn more income 
free of provincial PIT than people in the other provinces.
Second, at 10 per cent Alberta imposes a slightly higher marginal tax rate on the lowest 
bracket than some of the other provinces. However, the upper threshold of the first 
bracket is very high, with the 10-per-cent rate applied to incomes up to about $131,000, 
about three times higher than most of the other provinces.
Third, at 15 per cent the marginal tax rate on the top bracket in Alberta is lower than most 
other provinces (with the minor exception of Saskatchewan at 14.5 per cent), sometimes 
substantially so (e.g., Ontario and Quebec). Moreover, the income threshold at which the 
top rate applies in Alberta is about $315,000, which is substantially higher than the other 
provinces (and the federal government).
15 
See https://open.alberta.ca/publications/corporate-income-tax-special-notice-vol-5-no-53-application-
federal-expensing-investment-measures#summary
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TABLE 3  FEDERAL AND ALBERTA MARGINAL PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATES, 2019
Federal
• 15 per cent on the first $47,630 of taxable income, plus
• 20.5 per cent on the next $47,629 of taxable income (on the portion of taxable income 
over $47,629 up to $95,259), plus
• 26 per cent on the next $52,408 of taxable income (on the portion of taxable income over 
$95,259 up to $147,667), plus
• 29 per cent on the next $62,704 of taxable income (on the portion of taxable income over 
$147,667 up to $210,371), plus
• 33 per cent on taxable income over $210,371
Alberta
• 10 per cent on the first $131,220 of taxable income, plus
• 12 per cent on the next $26,244 of taxable income (on the portion of taxable income over 
$131,220 up to $157,464), plus
• 13 per cent on the next $52,488 of taxable income (on the portion of taxable income over 
$157,464 up to $209,952), plus
• 14 per cent on the next $104,976 of taxable income (on the portion of taxable income over 
$209,952 up to $314,928), plus
• 15 per cent on taxable income over $314,928
TABLE 4 SELECTED PROVINCIAL TAX BRACKETS AND RATES: 2019
Basic Personal 
Amount ($)
Lowest Bracket Tax 
Rate (%)
Upper Threshold of 
Lowest Bracket ($)
Top Bracket 
Threshold ($)
Top Bracket Tax 
Rate (%)
Alberta 19,369 10.0 131,220 314,928 15.0
British Columbia 12,069 5.06 40,707 153,900 16.8
Saskatchewan 16,065 10.5 45,225 129,214 14.5
Manitoba 9,926 10.8 32,670 70,610 17.4
Ontario 10,582 5.05 43,906 220,000 20.53*
Quebec 15,269 15.0 43,970 104,765 25.75
New Brunswick 10,264 9.68 42,592 157,773 20.3
Nova Scotia 8,481 8.79 29,590 150,000 21.0
Prince Edward Isle. 9,160 9.8 31,984 63,969 16.7
Newfoundland & Lab. 9,414 8.7 37,591 187,9'3 18.3
Federal 12,069 15.0 47,630 210,371 33.0
* Includes surtax
Figure 6 shows the combined (federal plus provincial) average tax rate (ATR) for different 
taxable income levels in Alberta, as well as the associated marginal tax rate (MTR) on an 
incremental dollar of income earned. The figure takes account only of the statutory rate 
schedules and brackets and the basic personal amounts, and does not include various 
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deductions and credits that depend on individual circumstances. We see that the MTR 
schedule is step-wise progressive, and that the ATR increases with income, reflective 
of an overall progressive rate structure. For example, an individual with taxable income 
of $20,000 (approximately the average income of the bottom 50 per cent of tax filers 
in Alberta) has an ATR of about six per cent; at an income of $40,000 (approximately 
equal to the median income of tax filers), the ATR is about 16 per cent. At an income 
of $90,000 (approximately equal to the average income of the top 50 per cent of tax 
filers), the ATR is about 23 per cent. For an individual earning $220,000 (approximately 
equal to the threshold to be in the top one per cent of tax filers in Alberta, the so-called 
one-percenters), the ATR is about 32 per cent. For an individual earning $400,000 
(approximately equal to the average income of the one-percenters), the ATR is about 40 
per cent (Statistics Canada 2016).
FIGURE 6  COMBINED FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL MARGINAL TAX RATES (MTR) 
AND AVERAGE TAX RATES (ATR): ALBERTA 2019
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How does this compare with other provinces? Figure 7 shows the ratio of the ATR in 
Alberta to three other provinces at various income levels. If that ratio is less than one, the 
ATR in Alberta is less than the other province, and Alberta taxes at that income level are 
lower; if the ratio is greater than one, the ATR and provincial taxes are higher in Alberta. 
A key characteristic of the Alberta PIT is evident in the figure. While the ATR in Alberta 
is lower than in Saskatchewan for all income levels, and is lower than Ontario and B.C. 
for low- and high-income earners, for middle-income earners the Alberta ATR is higher. 
The reason for this is twofold: as discussed, the low Alberta ATR at lower incomes is due 
to the very high basic personal amount relative to other provinces, while the lower ATR 
at higher incomes is due to relatively lower MTRs at the high end. More specifically, for 
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incomes above about $20,000 up to about $90,000 in Ontario and $150,000 in B.C. the 
ATR in Alberta is higher. The Alberta advantage on the PIT front is thus concentrated at 
the low and high ends of the income distribution; there is no Alberta advantage on the 
PIT for a wide range of middle-income earners. I will return to this in a discussion of a 
provincial sales tax below.
As discussed, in assessing the PIT as a source of government revenue we must consider 
both the efficiency and equity implications. And, as always, this relates to the magnitude 
of behavioural effects. It is not a drastic overstatement, though perhaps a bit reductive, 
to claim that while most of the economic action associated with tax policy happens at 
the top and bottom of the income distribution, most of the political action happens in the 
middle. By this, I mean that for the most part, the behavioural effects of middle-income 
earners are quite small. It is at the bottom and top of the distribution where behavioural 
changes are thought to be larger and of more concern.
FIGURE 7  RATIO OF COMBINED FEDERAL AND ALBERTA ATR TO SELECTED  
OTHER PROVINCES: 2019
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In terms of the bottom of the distribution, the key issue is what economists call the 
extensive margin, which is the impact of the tax and transfer system on the incentive 
to enter or leave the workforce. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze various 
Alberta programs in this regard. Suffice it to say that the high basic personal exemption 
is viewed as a positive feature of the Alberta PIT.
Of more relevance for the topic at hand is the Alberta PIT as it relates to the top of the 
distribution, which addresses the overall progressivity of the tax system over the middle- 
to higher-income range. This leads to a discussion of the flat tax.
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Prior to 2001, provincial PIT was calculated using the tax-on-tax approach, as a 
percentage of federal PIT payable. This meant that provinces were locked into 
the configuration of federal tax brackets, with the associated implications for the 
progressivity of the PIT.16 In 2001, as a part of the Tax Collection Agreement, the 
provinces were able to impose a tax on income directly. The provinces quickly moved to 
adopt their own tax rates and brackets. In short order, a relatively wide variance of tax 
rates and brackets emerged across the provinces, presumably in keeping with differences 
in the economic environment and the political and social values of the electorate. Alberta 
was unique in this regard in that beginning in 2001, it imposed a simple flat tax rate of 10 
per cent on income over the (relatively high) basic personal amount. This ended in 2015, 
when the Progressive Conservative government tabled a budget introducing two new 
tax brackets for incomes over $100,000. The PCs called an early election, in large part to 
obtain a mandate for their budget. They were defeated by the NDP, which subsequently 
introduced the current five-bracket regime, fully effective in 2016. 
For many, the Alberta flat tax was, and perhaps aspirationally still is, the very 
embodiment of the so-called Alberta Advantage. It is therefore natural to examine 
some of the issues that arise in the context of returning to the flat tax, and in cutting top 
marginal income rates in general.
Figure 8 shows the combined (provincial plus federal) MTR and ATR under the current 
system and the implementation of a 10 per cent flat tax in Alberta. As above, this reflects 
only the statutory rate schedule and the basic personal exemption (which is presumed 
to remain the same), and not various credits and deductions that may be available 
depending on individual circumstances. As shown, there is no difference between the 
two regimes for incomes up to the top of the existing first bracket of about $130,000. 
As indicated above, Alberta is unique in that it has a very large first bracket at which the 
10-per-cent rate applies. Canada Revenue Agency data suggest that the existing 10-per-
cent rate applies to about 90 per cent of Alberta taxpayers (Statistics Canada 2016). 
Thus, the vast majority of taxpayers in Alberta already face a flat tax! It of course follows 
that only 10 per cent of Alberta tax filers would benefit from a return to the flat tax, and 
that they would be at the upper end of the income distribution, with average incomes 
over $200,000. And of course, the benefits would be concentrated largely on those at 
the upper end of the upper end of the income distribution (the one-percenters).
16 
Many provinces imposed surtaxes on high incomes under the tax-on-tax system.
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FIGURE 8  COMBINED FEDERAL AND PROVINCIAL MARGINAL TAX RATES (MTR) 
AND AVERAGE TAX RATES (ATR): ALBERTA 2019 AND FLAT TAX
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What about the revenue implications? Media announcements made by the government 
suggest that a return to the flat tax would result in a reduction in government revenue of 
about $700 million per year (Mertz 2019). I have not been able to obtain an explanation 
for how this figure was determined. And so I undertake my own analysis using Statistics 
Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database and Model (SPSD/M), adjusted for provincial 
government forecasts of PIT revenues for 2019/20.17 
As emphasized throughout, it is important to understand the distinction between 
mechanical and behavioural effects in assessing the revenue implications of a tax cut. 
The mechanical calculation is straightforward accounting, presuming no behavioural 
changes in the underlying tax base. The behavioural calculation takes account of changes 
in the tax base (in the case of a tax cut, the growth in the tax base) as people respond 
to the change in the tax rate. As with the corporate tax, there are two basic behavioural 
margins thought to be important on the personal tax front. The first concerns the real 
effects of a tax cut, such as an increase in labour supply and/or in-migration as people 
potentially move to Alberta in response to the lower tax rate. The second behavioural 
margin involves income shifting, or tax planning. One aspect of this is the use of various 
tax planning techniques to shift income between jurisdictions in response to differences 
in tax rates between provinces and/or countries. Another aspect is converting income 
into tax-sheltered income that is taxed at a lower rate. Of course, there is also scope for 
outright tax evasion, which is illegal. As discussed above, all of this is captured in the 
metric of the elasticity of taxable income.
17 
This, and subsequent analysis in this paper, is based on Statistics Canada’s Social Policy Simulation Database 
and Model (SPSD/M). The assumptions and calculations underlying the simulation results were prepared by 
me and the responsibility for the use and interpretation of these data is entirely mine.
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The consensus among economists is that the elasticity of taxable income for most of 
the income distribution (the 99 per cent) is quite low, and indeed is not statistically 
indistinguishable from zero in most studies.18 However, at the top of the distribution (the 
one per cent), the elasticity of taxable income is higher. This is thought to be largely due 
to tax planning opportunities at higher incomes rather than real effects. Thus, the allusion 
above to much of the economic action in response to tax changes happening at the top 
of the distribution.
The range of estimates of the elasticity of taxable income in the economic research 
is quite wide, varying across jurisdictions and income levels, and by the statistical 
methodologies employed (Saez, Slemrod and Giertz 2012). Milligan and Smart (2015, 
2016) undertake a recent Canadian study, using data on the changes in top income 
shares and top marginal tax rates in the provinces during the 1988-2011 period. They 
estimate an elasticity of taxable income for high-income earners (the one per cent) of 
about 0.70. Other studies of high-income taxpayers have found tax responses of similar 
magnitude.19 Milligan’s and Smart’s (2015) estimate is based on differences in tax rates 
among provinces, and so may reflect taxpayers’ ability to shift income interprovincially in 
Canada. In subsequent research, Milligan and Smart (2019) investigate this directly. And 
indeed, they find that much of the responsiveness of the tax base of high-income earners 
in Canada is due to interprovincial income shifting. 
With this in hand, I undertake some rough calculations of the mechanical and behavioural 
revenue effects of a return to the flat tax. I make the following admittedly rough 
assumptions which are reflective of my reading of the research in this area. I assume that 
there are no behavioural effects on the part of middle-income taxpayers in the 12- and 
13-per-cent brackets; all of the behavioural action happens for taxpayers in the 14- and 
15-per-cent brackets, which requires income over about $210,000; this roughly coincides 
with the threshold for the top one per cent of taxpayers in Alberta (Statistics Canada 
2016). I assume an elasticity of taxable income for the top brackets of 0.70, as per 
Milligan and Smart (2015).
In terms of a straightforward mechanical calculation, SPSD/M simulations suggest 
that the imposition of a 10 per cent flat tax would lead to a reduction in provincial PIT 
revenues of about 10 per cent. The government forecast of provincial PIT revenue 
for 2018/19 from the February fiscal update is $12.14 billion. A 10-per-cent reduction 
therefore amounts to a mechanical reduction in revenue of $1.214 billion annually. But, of 
course, this ignores the offsetting behavioural effects, which suggest that there will be an 
expansion of the tax base due to the tax cut on high-income earners. Using Milligan’s and 
Smart’s elasticity of taxable income of 0.70, I calculate that the 10 per cent mechanical 
reduction in revenue is offset by a behavioural increase of about 3.9 per cent,20 or about 
18 
See for example Milligan and Smart 2015, 2016.
19 
For example, 0.84 is the average of top income elasticities in research surveyed in Chetty 2012.
20 
Adjusting Milligan and Smart (2015) to express things in percentage terms, the formula for the behavioural 
offset as a percentage of current PIT revenue is mea(tp/(1-tp-tf)), where m is the mechanical percentage 
change in revenue, e is the elasticity of taxable income, tp is the top provincial tax rate, tf is the top federal tax 
rate, and a=z/(z-b), where z is the average income of individuals in the top tax bracket and b is the threshold 
to be in the top bracket. I use data from Statistics Canada High Income Filers database to determine a.
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$474 million, for a total reduction in revenue of about $740 million per year, which is very 
close to the $700-million figure reported in the media.
As indicated, a return to the flat tax disproportionately benefits high-income earners. 
Some might consider this to be an equity loss on the distributional front. There are, 
of course, efficiency gains. Return again to Table 2 from Dahlby and Ferede (2016). 
Their MCF calculation for the PIT of $1.40 for Alberta is in fact for the top bracket. This 
means that a $1 decrease in PIT from top-bracket taxpayers yields additional economic 
benefits, over and above the dollar reduction in tax revenue, of 40 cents. This reflects the 
behavioural effects of a tax cut discussed above.
How can we evaluate the trade-off between the efficiency gain and the equity loss 
of such a tax cut? Economists have studied this issue extensively, with substantial 
advancements both methodologically and empirically over the last decade or so, under 
the heading of optimal labour income taxation.21
Modern optimal tax research addresses the equity-efficiency trade-off head on. The 
research emphasizes three metrics. These three metrics are sufficient to determine the 
optimal labour income tax rate on any tax bracket in a way that reflects the equity-
efficiency trade-off. The research has focused in particular on the optimal marginal tax 
rate on the top income bracket, and that will be my focus here.
The first metric is the elasticity of taxable income, discussed above throughout. This 
metric captures the behavioural effects of taxpayers, and therefore reflects efficiency 
considerations. The higher the elasticity of taxable income, the greater the efficiency 
costs associated with taxing high-income earners (the excess burden), and therefore (all 
else equal) the lower the optimal top marginal tax rate.
The second metric reflects the distribution of income within the top tax bracket itself, 
and measures the extent to which the distribution of income among high-income earners 
is skewed. In a nutshell, the less skewed the distribution of income among high-income 
earners, the more top-bracket earners are clustered or concentrated close to the top-
bracket threshold, and the lower (all else equal) the optimal top marginal tax rate.
These first two metrics can be estimated using existing data, although as discussed 
above, it is important to understand that there will be variation across different studies 
and it is important to consider a range of estimates. The final metric is the tricky one, and 
explicitly incorporates equity considerations. It is the social welfare weight that society 
places on a small increase in the well-being of top-bracket earners relative to everyone 
else. This metric encapsulates a value judgment on the part of the government regarding 
the weight it places on the incremental well-being of high-income earners relative to the 
rest of the population. 
We can shed some light on the factors that go into this social welfare weight. It can be 
thought of as the product of two things. The first is the value that top-bracket earners 
themselves place on an extra dollar of income, based on their own preferences. It is 
21 
For an overview of the literature, see Piketty and Saez (2013).
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typically thought that the value that an individual places on a small increase in income 
declines with income. Thus, for example, if your income is $5,000, you would place a 
relatively high value on an extra $100 in income, and would be willing to put some effort 
into earning it. If your income is $315,000, which would put you in the very top tax 
bracket in Alberta, and well above the threshold of the one per cent, you would place a 
relatively low value on an extra $100 in income. Indeed, it could be argued that at that 
income level, you place a value very close to zero on an extra $100 in income – i.e., it 
wouldn’t be worth the effort to earn it. This is referred to in economics as the declining 
marginal utility of income – the impact of a small increase in income on well-being 
declines as income increases.
For example, a study by Layard, Nickell and Mayraz (2008) estimates that a one percent 
increase in income is associated with a 1.26 percent decline in the marginal utility of 
income. The median tax filer in Alberta earns approximately $40,000, while the average 
income of a tax filer in the top 1 percent is 10 times higher, at about $400,000. The Layard, 
Nickell and Mayraz estimate suggests that the marginal utility of income for a median tax 
filer is therefore about 18 times higher than for an average tax filer in the top 1 percent.22
The second thing that goes into the social welfare weight is the valuation that society, 
as a collective represented by its government, places on the incremental well-being 
of high-income earners relative to everyone else. This is clearly highly subjective, and 
is manifested in the policy choices made by the government, reflecting in some way 
society’s preferences for redistribution. As a general rule, economists think that society 
is, at least to some extent, inequality averse; that is, society values some degree of 
redistribution. While it is difficult to measure the degree of inequality aversion in any 
objective sense, it seems reasonable as a general statement to presume that society 
places a lower weight on an incremental (this word is important!) increase in the well-
being of one-percenters relative to the rest of the population.
Some argue that these two factors – the declining marginal utility of income and 
inequality aversion on the part of society – together suggest that the social welfare 
weight placed on an incremental increase in income earned by high-income taxpayers in 
the top tax bracket is very small, and indeed might reasonably be approximated by zero! 
In this instance, a case can be made for choosing a top marginal tax rate that maximizes 
the revenue raised from the top tax bracket. This is the point Diamond and Saez (2011) 
make and is the academic justification behind recent calls for fairly substantial increases 
in the top marginal tax rate that are resonating to various degrees around the world.
What does all of this suggest for how we should think about a move back to a flat tax 
of 10 per cent in Alberta? I answer this question in two parts. First, using standard 
techniques from the optimal income tax literature, I undertake a rough calculation of 
22 
The authors assume a constant elasticity functional form for the indirect utility function. The ratio of marginal 
utilities of income is then calculated as (IM/IH)
u, where IM is median income, IH is the average income of the 1 
percent, and u is the elasticity of the marginal utility of income. Their estimate of u is 1.26 with a 95 percent 
confidence interval between 1.16-1.37. This gives (40000/400000)1.26=18.2.
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the revenue-maximizing top marginal tax rate in Alberta.23 Using the elasticity of taxable 
income from Milligan and Smart (2015), by my calculation, the revenue-maximizing 
provincial top bracket marginal tax rate in Alberta is about 28 per cent. This is clearly 
much higher than the current top rate of 15 per cent; coupled with the top federal rate 
of 33 per cent, this would substantially increase the top marginal tax rate on Alberta 
taxpayers from 48 per cent to 61 per cent!
Another way of thinking about this is as follows. The revenue-maximizing top marginal 
tax rate places a zero social welfare weight on an incremental increase in income 
accruing to top-bracket taxpayers. By my calculations, the existing Alberta tax system 
does not do this, as the current top tax rate of 15 per cent is well below the theoretical 
revenue-maximizing rate of 28 per cent. So consider the following exercise: presuming 
that the tax rate is chosen optimally from a social welfare point of view, what value of the 
social welfare weight on top-bracket earners is implied by the current tax system, and 
what would the change in the implied weight be if we moved to a flat tax? I calculate that 
a movement to a flat tax would reflect an increase in the implied social welfare weight 
on high-income earners of 23 per cent relative to the current implied weight. This means 
that the social values embodied in a move to a flat tax, which reflect the implied equity-
efficiency trade-off, would be consistent with increasing the social welfare weight on 
high-income earners relative to the rest of the population by 23 per cent.24
To be clear, I am not arguing for an increase in the top marginal tax rate in Alberta to 
the revenue-maximizing rate; the theoretical revenue maximizing rate is sensitive to the 
elasticity of taxable income, which is somewhat uncertain. Having said that, the analysis 
does suggest that an increase in the top rates may be defensible; at the very least, it 
suggests that maintaining some degree of marginal rate progressivity may be considered 
desirable from an equity-efficiency trade-off perspective. Rather, my point is that any 
increase or decrease in the top bracket marginal tax rate should be analyzed from this 
perspective. In particular, those who argue for a reduction in the top marginal tax rate, 
as in a return to a flat tax, should do so with a full recognition of the nature of the equity-
efficiency trade-off such a move implies.
A PROVINCIAL SALES TAX: THE LEAST COSTLY TAX OF ALL!
And so a sales tax. 
Alberta is, of course, the only province in the country without a provincial sales tax (PST). 
Perhaps arguably, the simple reason for this is that the province has not needed one; 
resource revenues from royalties have allowed the province to avoid levying a sales tax. 
23 
Adapting Piketty and Saez (2013) (see also Milligan and Smart 2015) to account for given federal taxes, the 
formula for the optimal top provincial marginal tax rate on labour income is tp*=(1-g)(1-tf)/(1-g+ea), where g 
is the marginal social welfare weight placed on top-bracket earners relative to the average of the rest of the 
population and the other variables are defined in footnote 24. The revenue maximizing provincial tax rate is 
determined by setting g=0.
24 
The formula for the marginal social welfare weight implied by the current tax system is determined by setting 
the optimal tax rate in the formula in the previous footnote equal to the actual tax rate and solving for g, 
which gives g=1-eatp/(1-tp-tf).
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For example, from 1993 to 2018, PST revenue accounted for about 23 per cent of own-
source revenues in the other provinces. Over the same period, natural resource revenues 
accounted for about 27 per cent of own-source revenues for Alberta. 
The PST is colloquially referred to by some in an Alberta context as the “political 
suicide tax”.25 Why would any government commit political suicide unless it has to? As 
suggested above, and borrowing from Nobel Prize-winning poet Bob Dylan, “the times 
they are a-changin’.”
To be clear, by PST I mean a value-added tax harmonized with the federal GST; i.e., a 
harmonized sales tax (HST). As has been discussed elsewhere, non-value-added taxes, 
like the retail sales taxes in B.C., Saskatchewan and Manitoba, end up inevitably imposing 
taxes on business inputs and taxing investment with the associated high-efficiency costs 
(Bazel and Mintz 2013).
Many economists, including myself, have argued for the introduction of a PST in Alberta 
for some time. Much of the formal analysis has focused on the introduction of a PST in 
a revenue-neutral context, with an offsetting reduction in personal or corporate income 
taxes. For example, almost 20 years ago, I analyzed a nine per cent Alberta PST that 
would completely replace the provincial PIT at that time (McKenzie 2000). More recently, 
Bazel and Mintz (2013) examined an eight per cent Alberta PST. They show that the 
revenue from the PST could be used to triple the basic personal amount, which would 
remove the majority of families in Alberta from the provincial PIT roll altogether, and still 
generate enough revenue to lower PIT rates by one percentage point and the CIT rate by 
3.5 percentage points.
The arguments in favour of a sales tax as part of the tax mix in Alberta are compelling 
from both an efficiency and equity perspective. Return again to Table 2, where we see 
that in terms of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) estimated by Dahlby and Ferede 
(2016), from an efficiency perspective a PST is the least costly tax of all, generating 
the lowest efficiency costs. This is because it is levied at a uniform rate across a broad 
spectrum of goods and services, and is therefore relatively non-distortionary, with low 
associated behavioural effects. This view of sales taxes (again, of the HST type) as the 
least costly tax of all in terms of efficiency is almost universally held by economists.
It is often argued that a sales tax is regressive, and therefore not attractive from an 
equity perspective, because lower-income households pay a greater percentage of their 
annual income in sales taxes than higher-income households. While this is true, one way 
of dealing with this would be to introduce a refundable PST tax credit at the provincial 
level, similar to the federal GST credit, which would provide relief for lower-income 
households. Moreover, economists argue that consumption is actually a better measure 
of an individual’s standard of living than current income. For example, consumption out 
of inherited wealth, or offshore income not reported to tax authorities, is subject to sales 
tax but not income tax. Finally, as Tombe (2018) emphasizes, an aging population will put 
25 
See for example “It’s Time for Alberta to Bite the Bullet and Impose a Sales Tax,” Editorial, The Globe and Mail, 
April 30, 2018. Available at https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-globe-editorial-its-
time-for-alberta-to-bite-the-bullet-and-impose-a/
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substantial pressure on health-care expenditures going forward. Sales taxes as a share 
of total income tend to increase with age (Crisan, McKenzie and Mintz 2015). Financing 
more of these rising expenditures by way of a sales tax could thus be viewed as being 
intergenerationally equitable.
Finally, much has been made about the volatility of resource revenues in Alberta. Landon 
and Smith (2010) examine the volatility of own-source tax revenues in Alberta from 1981-
2007. They use a common measure of volatility called the coefficient of variation.26 In 
terms of real per capita revenue, they calculate a total coefficient of variation for own-
source revenues of 15.4. For resource revenue, the coefficient is 46.6, for the PIT 10.2 and 
for the CIT 24.2. If Alberta had a PST, the coefficient of variation would be 12.0. As such, 
the introduction of a PST would do much to reduce the volatility of government revenue 
in Alberta.
While there is much to be said for a pure revenue-neutral shift toward a PST in Alberta, as 
discussed previously, I do not take a strong stand on this. As McKenzie (2000) and Bazel 
and Mintz (2013) argue, introducing a PST in Alberta would certainly generate revenue 
that could be used to reduce other taxes in a revenue-neutral manner. Expanding further 
on this, consider a two-percentage-point reduction in the marginal tax rates on the first 
three tax brackets in Alberta (see Table 3), maintaining the top two tax rates on income 
earners above the one-per-cent threshold (approximately $210,000) at the current levels. 
As discussed above (see Figure 7) middle-income Albertans are not currently in an 
advantageous position relative to some other provinces (B.C. and Ontario) in terms of the 
PIT. It might be argued that this in part reflects the absence of a sales tax in Alberta. As 
such, it might further be argued that some of the revenue raised from a sales tax should 
be used to lower personal income taxes on middle-income earners.27 SPSD/M simulations 
suggest a mechanical cost of such a cut of about $3 billion. As discussed above, there is 
not likely to be a significant behavioural offset in this income group. As also discussed 
above, a four-percentage-point cut in the CIT rate, accounting for long-run behavioural 
effects, may cost about $740 million per annum in forgone revenue. Thus, a very rough 
estimate of the forgone revenue from cutting personal and corporate tax rates in this way 
would be a little under $4 billion. Based on Bazel and Mintz (2013), a rough calculation 
suggests that a five per cent Alberta PST would generate about $5 billion in revenue, 
enough to cut both PIT and CIT rates and still generate revenue to address the deficit 
and/or spending priorities. 
Of course, many other configurations are possible. My point is that the introduction of a 
PST in Alberta would give the province access to a very efficient and non-volatile source 
of tax revenue, vastly improving the tax mix regardless of how the revenue is deployed. 
Distributional concerns could be allayed by coupling the introduction of a PST with a 
refundable tax credit aimed at lower-income Albertans and a middle-class PIT rate cut.
26 
The coefficient of variation is the ratio (multiplied by 100) of the standard deviation of the differences from an 
exponential trend to the average value of the series. 
27 
Of course a reduction in the middle income tax rates would also benefit high income earners in higher tax 
brackets.
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What about the political suicide thing? In a forthcoming essay in a volume devoted to a 
discussion of a sales tax in Alberta, I recall an encounter I had with former premier Ralph 
Klein in the late 1990s (McKenzie, forthcoming 2019). He indicated that he wasn’t actually 
philosophically opposed to such a tax, and indeed understood the economic arguments. 
He recognized, however, that there was considerable opposition to the idea in Alberta, 
and could not envision a scenario whereby it could be implemented in the near future. He 
did indicate, however, that if a “parade” were to begin in support of such a tax, he would 
be willing to “get out in front of it.” For the reasons discussed throughout, there is, in my 
view, reason to believe that such a parade may be starting.
OTHER SOURCES OF REVENUE: KEEP ALL OF THE CARBON 
TAX (BUT MAKE IT REVENUE NEUTRAL)
There are, of course, other sources of revenue aside from the PIT, the CIT and a PST. 
From Figure 3, we see that the provincial property tax is projected to generate $2.5 
billion in 2019, the fuel tax $1.4 billion and the carbon tax $1.3 billion. It is evident from 
Figure 1 that as a totality, other revenue as a share of GDP in Alberta has in fact declined 
over the last two decades. This suggests scope for adjustments to a myriad of other 
revenue sources. It is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze each of these revenue 
sources in detail. However, given its prominence, it is perhaps useful to discuss some 
issues associated with the carbon tax. 
It is important to distinguish between two ways of looking at a carbon tax. The first is 
as a source of government revenue alone, the second is as a corrective tax intended 
to encourage a reduction in carbon emissions and reduce the costs associated with 
climate change. 
When viewed as a source of revenue alone, ignoring the environmental impact, a carbon 
tax is not an attractive tax relative to alternatives. The carbon tax is sometimes referred 
to as a “tax on everything”, but this is misleading. To the extent that “everything” 
employs fossil fuel inputs, to some extent it is a tax on everything, but the tax clearly 
falls most heavily on carbon-intensive goods; indeed, that is the whole idea. As such, it 
changes relative prices between goods based on their implicit carbon content. From a 
pure revenue-raising/tax-design perspective, ignoring environmental considerations, this 
is not a good thing. By changing relative prices between goods based on their carbon 
content alone, a carbon tax distorts economic behaviour and generates excess burdens 
with the associated efficiency costs. A true “tax on everything”, like a sales tax, would be 
a much more efficient way to raise revenue than a carbon tax, because it is imposed at a 
uniform rate on all (or most) goods and services. This is more efficient from a revenue-
raising perspective as it does not alter relative prices to the same extent. Thus, if the 
government simply wants to raise a given amount of revenue via either a carbon tax or 
a sales tax – and again, ignoring the implications for climate change – a sales tax wins 
hands down!
But of course, that is not why we impose a carbon tax. The whole point is precisely 
to distort economic behaviour away from carbon-intensive activities because these 
activities generate negative externalities. Negative externalities exist when the 
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consumption (and/or production) of a good imposes costs on the economy over and 
above the private costs borne by individuals and businesses. Thus the social cost of 
consumption (or production) is greater than the private cost. As a result, individuals 
over-consume (and firms over-produce) goods that generate negative externalities. The 
consumption and production of carbon-intensive goods result in a negative externality 
in the form of the costs associated with climate change. A carbon tax internalizes 
these costs. The whole idea is to in fact change economic behaviour by lowering the 
consumption and production of carbon-intensive goods. From the perspective of the 
environment – this time ignoring the efficiency implications from a revenue-raising 
perspective – a carbon tax wins hands down!
So carbon taxes are attractive as an instrument to address climate change, but not as 
a way to raise government revenue. But of course, they do generate revenue, and the 
question is what to do with it.
One view is that since we collect it, we may as well spend it. According to this view, 
the revenue from a carbon tax is in a sense “free”, an added bonus over and above 
the beneficial impact on the environment. This is a fallacy. As economists never tire 
of pointing out, there is no such thing as a free lunch. There is an extensive literature 
which shows carbon tax revenue is not free in any sense (Bovenberg and Goulder 
1998).28 Rather, it imposes costs on the economy along with the beneficial impact on the 
environment; as indicated above, from a pure revenue-raising perspective, a sales tax 
wins hands down over a carbon tax. One reason for this is that a carbon tax interacts with 
other distortionary taxes, like taxes on labour income, capital, etc. This exacerbates the 
distortions and excess burdens associated with these other taxes; this is called the tax 
interaction effect. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this issue in more depth;29 however, to 
reiterate, as a pure revenue generator the carbon tax is not a good tax. But it is a good 
tax from an environmental perspective. And so what to do? Don’t make it a revenue 
generator of course! By this, I simply mean offset any revenue generated by the carbon 
tax with reductions in revenues from other taxes – make the carbon tax revenue neutral 
by lowering personal income taxes and/or corporate income taxes appropriately.
Some people argue that this is nonsensical, that if the government needs the revenue 
from the carbon tax to spend on some program or to lower the deficit, they may as 
well just use it. This misses the point, and is in fact logically incorrect from an economic 
perspective. The government always has the option, the opportunity, to raise the 
required revenue in some other way that is more efficient (for example, a sales tax). 
Recall the above discussion regarding the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) – the 
full economic cost of raising one more dollar in tax revenue. If the marginal benefit of 
spending another dollar of revenue on some activity is greater than the MCF of raising 
that dollar, then from a cost-benefit perspective the expenditure should take place. 
But, as we have seen, the MCF varies between taxes. So what MCF should we use when 
28 
In an Alberta context, see McKenzie (2016).
29 
Ibid.
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making this assessment? I would argue that it should be the MCF associated with the 
most expensive source of revenue, and we have seen that the CIT is the costliest tax of 
all. This is because the government always has the option, the opportunity, of lowering 
the CIT rather than spending the money – the opportunity cost of one more dollar spent 
on some government program, or on lowering the deficit, or on any government activity, 
is the forgone gain from lowering the costliest tax of all. Thus, the best use of carbon 
tax revenue from an efficiency perspective is to lower the CIT rate in a revenue-neutral 
manner. Then, if the government wants to spend money on some new program, or lower 
the deficit, or whatever, it should raise the money in the most efficient and equitable way 
possible (raising less costly taxes, cutting other spending or some combination of both). 
There is no logical economic argument that justifies increasing (or decreasing) the size of 
government just because there is (or isn’t) a carbon tax.
The UCP government eliminated the carbon tax in Alberta on June 1, 2019. Well, sort 
of. In point of fact, the government eliminated only part of the carbon tax, not the 
whole thing. The part of the carbon tax imposed on fuel and natural gas consumed by 
individuals and many businesses has been eliminated; however, the government has 
maintained the carbon tax on large emitters, though it has indicated that it will lower the 
rate from the current $30 a tonne to $20. The part of the carbon tax that will remain in 
place – they now call it a compliance levy – applies to about half of Alberta emissions 
and will generate about $600 million in net revenue, compared to $1.4 billion under the 
previous tax. 
The government has earmarked the funds from the compliance levy to subsidize green 
technology initiatives. From a political point of view this may be attractive, but from an 
economic perspective it is a mistake. It may (or may not) be sensible to subsidize such 
technology. But tying the level of such funding to the amount generated by the carbon 
tax/compliance levy makes little economic sense because it is unlikely that the proper 
amount to spend on subsidizing these technologies is in any way related to the amount of 
money raised by the compliance levy; it may be too high or too low. Earmarking taxes in 
this manner is not generally considered to be best practice from an economic perspective.
Perhaps more importantly, because of the (partial) elimination of the Alberta carbon 
tax, the so-called federal backstop carbon tax will now be applied to Alberta (though 
at this point not on large emitters). And so the province will simply forgo the revenue, 
transferring it to the federal government. While under the federal government program 
the revenue will be returned to Albertans on an equal per capita lump sum basis, this 
does not eliminate the distortions associated with the carbon tax discussed above. There 
are better things that can be done with the money than funnelling it through the federal 
government to be handed back as lump sum payments. A better option would be to 
keep the money in Alberta in the first place. The first best choice would then be to use 
the money to fund reductions in more distortionary taxes, but barring that, lowering the 
deficit or even financing priority expenditures would be better than simply giving the 
money to the federal government to be recycled back to Albertans in a lump sum manner. 
35
WHAT ABOUT RESOURCE REVENUES?
Given the prominence of resource revenue in the Alberta revenue structure (in the 
2018/19 forecast to account for 11 per cent of total revenue), what can we say about 
potential changes to the structure of resource royalties? In a word, nothing. 
A disclosure – I was a member of the royalty review panel appointed by former premier 
Ed Stelmach in 2007. Premier Rachel Notley appointed another panel in 2016. As a result 
of these two panels, the royalty structure in Alberta has been reviewed in some detail 
over the last 12 years and it is well beyond the scope of this paper to revisit the issues 
that arise in this regard.
I will, however, make a few additional observations on the general role of resource 
revenue in Alberta’s big fiscal picture, building upon some points made previously. A 
recent paper by Kneebone and Wilkins (2018) examines 50 years of resource-based 
government budgeting in Alberta. They show that there has been a marked positive 
relationship between the non-resource revenue primary deficit and resource revenues.  
As discussed earlier, this reflects the tendency for governments to notch up spending 
(and the primary deficit) in response to higher resource revenues. Kneebone and 
Wilkins pin this on what they call the “fiscal illusion” associated with resource royalties. 
Fiscal illusion is the tendency for governments and citizens/taxpayers to systematically 
underestimate the true cost of publicly provided goods and services. In Alberta, fiscal 
illusion arises because resource revenues allow taxpayers to avoid, at least temporarily, 
the true cost of funding government expenditures. As Kneebone and Wilkins (2018, 
10) state, the Alberta approach to fiscal policy “is consistent with the fiscal-illusion 
hypothesis: As the availability of resource revenues grows, governments in Alberta have 
found it easier to find political support for financing increases in program spending.” This 
is reflective of the “don’t worry, be happy” approach to budgeting discussed previously.
I have argued that one way for the government to get off the royalty roller-coaster is to 
introduce a PST, which is a much more stable source of revenue. Another would be to 
implement a systematic plan to save at least a portion of resource revenue. The economic 
research on the appropriate budgetary treatment of non-renewable resource revenues 
is conclusive in this regard: non-renewable resource revenues should be saved and 
converted into an enduring monetary asset. This is the well-known Hartwick rule, which 
argues that intergenerational equity considerations argue strongly for “monetizing” non-
renewable resource wealth in a savings fund as it is extracted.30 
To the extent that actions on the revenue front such as introducing a PST and maintaining 
the full carbon tax give rise to additional revenue, and actions on the expenditure front 
slow down spending growth, hopefully putting the province on a sustainable fiscal 
path, consideration should be given to saving some of the resource revenue. A first step 
would be to reinstitute the stabilization funds of the early 2000s, and then eventually to 
restore contributions to the Heritage Fund in some manner, even if just modestly.31 This 
30 
Hartwick (1977).
31 
Equivalently resource revenue could be used to pay down provincial debt.
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argument is all the more compelling given the uncertainty regarding the province’s ability 
to extract all of its resource wealth in the future, which would essentially leave a valuable 
asset stranded.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I have examined various revenue sources for the government of Alberta. 
I take a first-principles approach, viewing the question through the standard welfare 
economics lens of efficiency and equity.
In sum, I argue for the following:
1. Cut the corporate income tax rate as planned.
2. Keep the full provincial carbon tax.
3. Maintain the progressive rate structure in the personal income tax (no flat tax), but 
consider a middle class personal income tax cut.
4. Impose a harmonized provincial sales tax.
To the extent that these changes, coupled with reforms on the expenditure front, place 
the province on a sustainable fiscal path, consideration should be given to reintroducing 
systematic contributions to a stabilization fund and then, eventually, the Heritage Fund.
The economic environment going forward will, in my view, be very different than what 
the province has faced historically – the Alberta of the future is very unlikely to look like 
the Alberta of the past. Returning to fiscal sustainability will require some choices on 
both the revenue and expenditure fronts. The types of changes to the revenue regime 
discussed above would, in my view, go some way to implementing a tax system that 
appropriately balances efficiency and equity considerations.
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